Testimonial Insult: A Moral Reason for Belief? by Malcolm, Finlay
Research Archive
Citation for published version:
Finlay Malcolm, ‘Testimonial Insult:  A Moral Reason for 
Belief?’, Logos & Episteme, Vol. 9 (1): 27-48, 2018.
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme2018912
Document Version:
This is the Published Version. 
Copyright and Reuse: 
© 2018 Filiala Iași - Institutul de Cercetări Economice şi
Sociale "Gh.Zane").  Reproduced by permission from Logos & 
Episteme.
Content in the UH Research Archive is made available for 
personal research, educational, and non-commercial 
purposes only. Unless otherwise stated, all content is 
protected by copyright, and in the absence of an open 
license, permissions for further re-use should be sought from 
the publisher, the author, or other copyright holder. 
Enquiries
If you believe this document infringes copyright, please contact Research & 
Scholarly Communications at rsc@herts.ac.uk
 LOGOS & EPISTEME, IX, 1 (2018): 27-48 
TESTIMONIAL INSULT: A MORAL 
REASON FOR BELIEF? 
Finlay MALCOLM 
 
ABSTRACT: When you don’t believe a speaker’s testimony for reasons that call into 
question the speaker’s credibility, it seems that this is an insult against the speaker. There 
also appears to be moral reasons that count in favour of refraining from insulting 
someone. When taken together, these two plausible claims entail that we have a moral 
reason to refrain from insulting speakers with our lack of belief, and hence, sometimes, a 
moral reason to believe the testimony of speakers. Reasons for belief arising from non-
epistemic sources are controversial, and it’s often argued that it’s impossible to base a 
belief on non-epistemic reasons. However, I will show that even if it is possible to base a 
belief on non-epistemic reasons, in the case of testimonial insult, for many or most cases, 
the moral reasons for belief don’t need to be the basis of our doxastic response. This is 
because there are, in many or most cases, either sufficient epistemic reasons for belief, or 
sufficient moral reasons for action that guide our response to testimony. Reasons from 
testimonial insult, in many cases, simply lead to overdetermination. Even if there are 
such moral reasons for belief, they are therefore practically unnecessary in many cases. 
There are, though, some cases in which they play an important role in guiding belief. 
This perhaps surprising conclusion is one unexplored way to defend epistemic over 
pragmatic reasons for belief. 
KEYWORDS: belief, testimony, insult, reasons, moral, epistemic 
 
1. Introduction 
What should be our doxastic response toward someone’s testimony? In other 
words, what normative reasons count in favour of belief, disbelief and suspended 
judgment concerning p when someone has told us p? It’s typical to focus discussion 
on this question around epistemic reasons, which bear on whether or not the 
testimony is, or is likely to be true.1 Centring discussion on such epistemic reasons 
                                                        
1 Nishi Shah, “A New Argument for Evidentialism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2006): 481-
498. I follow Lord in defining epistemic reasons as “the reasons for belief, disbelief, and 
withholding that bear on epistemic rationality or justification, which is… constitutively tied to 
truth” (Errol Lord, “Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Reasons and Normativity, ed. Daniel Star (Oxford University Press, forthcoming), n.8). 
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is relevant to epistemologists because it’s thought that responding appropriately to 
these kinds of reasons is essential for knowledge.2 However, epistemic reasons may 
not be the only reasons that bear on how we should respond to testimony. Some 
authors maintain that there are other norms in play too. Common amongst these 
are pragmatic reasons for belief, such as believing for instrumental gain. One 
widely cited example of a pragmatic reason is believing certain propositions in 
order to overcome illness.3 So, whilst believing for pragmatic reasons may not be 
sufficient for knowledge, it may be sufficient for obtaining other desirable goods. 
An important kind of pragmatic reason for belief comes from moral 
considerations. One such example is derived from the Kantian notion that theistic 
belief is required in order to wholly believe in a moral order, which is itself 
required to motivate people to contribute to the good in the world.4 If this is so 
then one has a moral reason for belief in God. One moral example that connects 
directly with testimony is testimonial injustice.5 If a kind of injustice is performed 
when a speaker is disbelieved purely on the basis of social identity prejudice, then 
the speaker’s audience have a moral reason to revise their doxastic response to the 
testifier so as to correct the injustice. 
This paper considers another possible moral reason for believing a speaker’s 
testimony. The reason comes from recent reflection on the claim that not believing 
speakers can be insulting for the speaker. G. E. M Anscombe once made a similar 
remark: “It is an insult and it may be an injury not to be believed.”6 There are 
                                                        
2 Mark Schroeder, “Knowledge is Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason,” Oxford 
Studies in Epistemology, 5 (2015): 225-252. 
3 Gilbert Harman, Reasoning, Meaning and Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 6. 
4 Robert Merrihew Adams, “Moral Arguments for the Existence of God,” in The Virtue of Faith 
and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 144–
163; Michael Pace, “The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral 
Encroachment, and James’ ‘Will To Believe’,” Nous 45 (2011): 239-268. This is also related to J. L. 
Mackie’s sentiments that “the abandonment of a belief in objective values can cause, at least 
temporarily, a decay of subjective concern and sense of purpose” (Ethics: Inventing Right and 
Wrong (London: Pelican Books, 1977), 34). 
5 Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
6 G. E. M Anscombe, “What is it to Believe Someone?” in Rationality and Religious Belief, ed. C. 
F. Delaney (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 150. I have attempted to give an 
account of Anscombe’s claim in my paper “How to Insult and Compliment a Testifier,” Episteme, 
15:1 (2018): 50-64. For another account, see Allan Hazlett, “On the Special Insult of Refusing 
Testimony,” Philosophical Explorations, 20 (2017): 37-51. Similar remarks to that of Anscombe 
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several ways in which philosophers have tried to elaborate on this claim, but I 
want to explore the following: Supposing that under certain conditions, it is 
insulting to reject a speaker’s testimony (to disbelieve or suspend judgment about 
it). Call this a testimonial insult. Do testimonial insults give us a reason to believe 
the speaker as a means of avoiding paying her an insult?7 The argument would 
then be: 
(1) If some action or attitude A is an insult against a person, then one has a moral 
reason to avoid A-ing, 
(2) Rejecting the testimony of a speaker is sometimes an insult against the 
speaker,  
(3) So, there is sometimes a moral reason to avoid rejecting a speaker’s testimony. 
What makes this particular moral reason arising from testimonial insult 
especially interesting and worth exploring is its social significance. Throughout 
this paper I will give certain examples of this significance, but suffice for now to 
say that testimonial insult is particularly important for the way we think of 
interpersonal trust, and certain relationship groups such as marriage and 
friendship.  
This paper has two broad aims: first, to defend premises (1) and (2), and 
hence to try to establish (3); second, to explore the place of reasons for belief 
arising from testimonial insult alongside epistemic reasons for belief in order to 
identify what sort of functional role they occupy. In addressing this second aim, 
we will see an interesting and perhaps surprising result. In many cases where 
rejecting testimony gives one a moral reason to believe the testimony, there are 
other, non-moral sufficient reasons for the hearer to believe the testimony. 
Oftentimes these alternative reasons simply show that one does not need to believe 
the testimony on the basis of the moral reason one has: one can believe the 
testimony for the non-moral reason. In other cases, there are other, equally good 
means by which someone can avoid paying an insult that involve action rather 
                                                                                                                      
have been made by J. L. Austin: “If I have said I know or I promise, you insult me in a special 
way by refusing to accept it” (“Other Minds,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement 
20 (1946): 171); and Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments: “It is always mortifying 
not to be believed” (VII.iv.24). 
7 Later in this paper I discuss the role that accepting a speaker’s testimony can play in avoiding 
paying the speaker an insult. For now, though, I am focussing solely on doxastic means of 
avoiding the insult. 
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than belief. What I will conclude, then, is that even if, in theory, testimonial 
insults give moral reasons for belief, in practice, for many or perhaps most cases, 
one need not actually base one’s beliefs on these reasons because there are 
sufficient or equally good alternatives. It follows that testimonial insult, as a moral 
reason for belief, does not need to actually play a functional role in guiding our 
doxastic response to testimony for many or most cases. I will also show, though, 
where moral reasons for belief deriving from testimonial insult do have an 
important bearing on what to believe. 
I will begin in §2 by defending premises (1) and (2) by outlining how 
rejecting testimony is sometimes insulting for the speaker. Then, in §3, I will focus 
my defence on premise (1) by showing what reasons we have to avoid insulting 
others in general, and in testimonial contexts in particular. I will hence be 
favouring the view that there are genuine moral reasons for belief. However, in §4, 
upon close analysis of cases of testimony, I will show in which circumstances 
moral reasons that are grounded in avoiding insulting testifiers need not be the 
basis for one’s belief. I will also show where they have an important bearing on 
what to believe. 
There have been numerous attempts to reject the possibility of moral reasons 
for belief.8 Rather than responding to these objections, I will present my argument 
as a conditional: even if it is possible to base a belief on non-epistemic reasons, in 
the case of testimonial insult, the arising moral reasons for belief do not in many or 
most cases need to be the basis for our doxastic response to testimony; there are, in 
many or most cases, sufficient alternatives in the form of epistemic reasons for 
belief, or moral reasons for action. I take this conclusion to be somewhat 
surprising, and to provide a unique strategy that others may find useful who would 
like to focus greater attention toward epistemic reasons for belief, and away from 
non-epistemic reasons. 
2. Insult and Testimony 
The simple claim made in (2) – affirmed by Anscombe and others – is that when 
some speaker S tells, or testifies to a proposition p to some hearer or audience H, if 
H’s doxastic response to p is one of non-belief, then this response of H’s – the 
doxastic attitude that H forms in response to S’s testimony – constitutes an insult 
against S. I shall attempt to bring a little more clarity to this claim. 
                                                        
8 Shah, “A New Argument.” 
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What is meant by H’s doxastic attitude being one of non-belief? Although 
there is usually thought to be just one kind of positive doxastic response, that of 
belief, there are two options when it comes to non-belief: suspension of judgment, 
and disbelief. In either case, the testimony of the speaker is resisted, rejected, or in 
some way not believed. A slightly simplified, but formal way to state the claim is 
that when S tells H that p,9 
H forms D toward p  D is insulting for S.10 
Why might D be insulting for S? Two points need to be addressed here. 
First, rejecting a proposition testified to by a speaker is tantamount to not believing 
the speaker herself.11 Second, according to some accounts of testimony, when a 
speaker asserts p, she puts forward p as true and hence vouches for the truth of p.12 
In vouching for p, the speaker makes a reflexive remark about herself as a credible 
source of truth. She is saying that one may use her testimony to form a reliable 
belief concerning p under the confident assumption that she is a credible testifier. 
This may come in at least two forms. One could be credible with respect to 
speaking truly, or with respect to knowing competently. It seems that both of these 
are involved, to some extent at least, in the credibility one requires to properly 
vouch for the truth of a proposition. 
Two recent papers have independently maintained that it’s in the 
undermining of this credibility that the hearer’s non-belief is insulting for the 
speaker.13 When H does not believe S because she takes S to be either epistemically 
incompetent or dishonest, this reflects negatively, in an insulting way, on S’s 
credibility as a testifier. Now, a characteristic of insults is that they are disparaging 
to the other person in some way,14 and having your credibility as a testifier called 
                                                        
9 ‘Tellings’ are often performed by verbal, or spoken language, but can also be performed in 
written form, such as letters, and by hand gestures. 
10 As a key, D is a doxastic attitude covering disbelief and suspension of judgment, H is the hearer 
and S is the speaker, and p is the proposition testified to. 
11 Anscombe’s own work addresses what it is to believe someone, rather than some proposition. 
But in cases of testimony, believing the testimony p amounts to believing the person, and not 
believing the testimony p amounts to not believing the person. 
12 Elizabeth Fricker, “Second-Hand Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
LXXIII (2006): 594. 
13 Malcolm, “How to Insult;” Hazlett, “On the Special Insult.” 
14 David Archard, “Insults, Free Speech and Offensiveness,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 
(2014): 129. 
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into question can be disparaging for a number of reasons.15 Working on the 
assumption that something like this account of testimonial insult is broadly 
accurate, we can see under what conditions it is insulting to not be believed by 
someone. However, it looks like there will also be cases where lack of belief will 
not constitute an insult: when the reasons for this are unrelated to the credibility 
of the speaker. Suppose we are going for a meeting, and you tell me we are booked 
into room number 10. Unbeknown to you though, I have changed the booking 
from room number 10 to number 11. Even though I disbelieve what you tell me, I 
don’t do so for reasons relating to your credibility – you aren’t being dishonest or 
incompetent – I simply know something you don’t, nor should you. This means the 
conditional above is too strong. Instead, when S tells H that p, 
H forms D toward p for reason R  D is insulting for S 
where R stands for any reason for not believing the testimony that reflects 
negatively on the credibility of S as a testifier. Only when the non-belief is for this 
reason will it be insulting. 
One possible reason for thinking that the above conditional is too strong are 
cases in which the hearer is epistemically warranted in rejecting the speaker’s 
testimony.16 Anscombe herself appeared to defend such a position: “Compare the 
irritation of a teacher at not being believed. On the whole, such irritation is just… 
But if what was not believed should turn out to be false, his complaint collapses.”17 
From this we might say that if someone disbelieves a speaker because she is 
justified in believing the speaker to be speaking falsely, then this is not insulting 
for the speaker. However, cases like this are still disparaging for speakers. To take 
Anscombe’s example, say a science teacher is disbelieved by her students for the 
reason (R) that the students believe the teacher to lack credibility as a scientist. In 
addition, suppose that the students are correct in their assessment, and that what 
the teacher presents to them is not true. Regardless, the students’ disbelief 
manifests an insult against the teacher. This is the teacher’s livelihood, and it is 
                                                        
15 In Malcolm, “How to Insult,” I offer several cases to explain why this carries negative 
implications for the speaker, some of which, for example, affect her social role as a distributer of 
knowledge. 
16 See, for instance, Hazlett: “refusing someone’s testimony constitutes insulting her only when it 
manifests unreasonable (unjustified, irrational, unwarranted) doubt about her credibility” (“On 
the Special Insult,” 43-44). See also Jeremy Wanderer, “Addressing Testimonial Injustice: Being 
Ignored and Being Rejected,” The Philosophical Quarterly 62 (2012): 165-166. 
17 Anscombe, “What is it to Believe,” 9. 
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being challenged, and rightfully so, on the basis that the teacher is incompetent as 
a scientist – in the very thing that the teacher is supposed to have expertise and 
competence in. Of course, the teacher cannot complain about being disbelieved, 
but it still follows that she’s insulted because she is regarded as incompetent (see 
§4.3 for further discussion and defence of this claim). 
Supposing that the above conditional holds, then the next feature to be 
noted is that the consequent does not maintain that S is insulted by D. Since D is 
an internal mental state, S might never become aware of D. We might wonder, 
then, why D is insulting for S on those occasions where S does not become aware 
of D. After all, insults are disparaging and hence cause offence to the insulted 
party. But insults can still be performed even if the insulted party is not aware that 
she has been insulted. It seems possible, for instance, to be insulted in a language 
one does not understand. Moreover, a person’s internal racist attitudes would be 
insulting toward others if they became revealed. This suggests that insults merely 
have the potential to offend, and do not depend for their existence on causing 
actual offence.  
Does it follow from this that if S becomes aware of the insult then S will be 
offended by it? It seems not. This is because someone might not regard an insult as 
offensive, despite the fact that when accusing someone of having a certain property 
that is tracked by the insult, this accusation ought to cause offence. Take, for 
instance, a newspaper reporter who thrives on spreading falsehoods to garner more 
attention for her journalism. If you accuse her of being a liar, you are attributing 
the property of being a liar onto the reporter that you take to be negative, which 
you intend to be an insult, and which, under normal circumstances, would be 
regarded as offensive. However, the reporter might appropriate this property in a 
positive fashion, and take your accusation as a compliment. Given this, she might 
become aware of your insult, and yet not be offended by it. 
One way to make sense of this is in terms of the distinction between 
‘illocutionary act’ and ‘perlocutionary effect.’18 The illocutionary command to ‘shut 
the door’ may be successfully performed in the sense that it’s been spoken 
felicitously, whilst the perlocutionary effect of the command may be unsuccessful 
if the person commanded fails to actually shut the door. Similarly, an insult can 
                                                        
18 J.L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1962). 
For further discussion of Austin’s distinction as it applies to insult see Jerome Neu, Sticks and 
Stones: The Philosophy of Insults (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 164-170. 
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succeed in picking out some denigrating property of a person, and yet fail if that 
person is not offended by it. So, when S tells H that p, 
S becomes aware of D  S is warranted in feeling offended by H. 
This conditional can make sense of cases like the dishonest reporter. 
Importantly, though, it also has an ethical function of making sense of other cases, 
such as examples of injustice. Suppose you are brought up in a society in which it is 
customary to belittle people because of their skin colour, race, gender, sexuality, 
etc. (A society that does not, unfortunately, even require imagining). If you are 
belittled in virtue of any of these features in an unjust way, you may simply accept 
it without feeling offended. You might just agree that this is your status in society 
and live with it. Does it follow that you have not been insulted? I wouldn’t say so. 
These kinds of cases of injustice look entirely insulting, and you are warranted in 
feeling offended, even if you never do feel offended. 
A final issue I want to address at this stage is whether, despite appearances, 
one’s doxastic response to testimony really ever can be insulting for people. 
Suppose we think of insults as being intended to denigrate and offend the other. 
Well, if we think that our doxastic states are not under our direct voluntary 
control, then it would follow that we can’t directly adopt them with any intention 
in mind, let alone one to insult another person. This objection fails though because 
one’s actions, words and attitudes can be insulting by accident or without any 
intention to insult. An innocent hand gesture in one culture is insulting to people 
in another, just as one’s direct confrontational stance in an argument can be 
insulting in some cultures, and not insulting in others. And yet perhaps these 
culturally-sensitive acts are not, in fact, insults after all, but only bear the mere 
appearance of an insult. The person feeling insulted is actually unwarranted in this 
feeling for the very reason that insults must be intended, and sometimes we just 
aren’t aware of a culture’s systems. This may be correct for culturally-sensitive 
insults, but there are other unintended insults that are not culturally-sensitive. An 
overheard insult is one such case. I can say something denigrating of you to a 
friend without intending to insult you, but if you overhear what I say, then I will 
insult you, and moreover, you will be warranted in feeling insulted. Moreover, 
suppose I believe that some politician is poor at her job, through no direct choice 
of my own. Isn’t this belief insulting to her? And if she became aware of this, 
wouldn’t she be warranted in feeling insulted? Finally, I can insult someone 
unintentionally by insulting her intelligence with overbearing, protracted advice 
on straightforward everyday matters. If the culturally-sensitive examples are not 
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sufficient to show that insults can be unintentional, then I suggest these three cases 
demonstrate that insults needn’t be intended to actually exist.19 
Let’s move now to consider ethical issues around insults, and how these 
apply to the specific case of testimonial insult.  
3. Reasons Against Insulting 
Given that various actions and attitudes constitute an insult, it seems plausible that 
this fact gives us reasons to refrain from performing such actions or holding such 
attitudes. I expect that there are several arguments that support this claim, but I 
will prioritise discussion of two. 
First, insults may cause harmful effects against the insulted party. According 
to the above account, one of the causes of insults are offence. Joel Feinberg has 
claimed that “to be forced to suffer an offence…is an unpleasant inconvenience, 
and hence an evil.”20 This could be the case if the offence one suffers brings up 
certain reactive emotions such as anger, humiliation, fear and resentment.21 These 
emotions can make it harder to live one’s life and sometimes even to exist 
cooperatively with others in society. Consider a group of people living in a 
community who are consistently targeted by verbal pejoratives from those whom 
they come into contact with. Not only will offence and the emotions caused by it 
be the likely and justified outcome of the insult for the individuals of the group, 
but so will a lack of any feeling of trust, which in turn can cause one to feel 
isolated and unwilling to do kindness toward others. 
Although this offence and emotional response is a possible, and perhaps in 
some situations, likely outcome of insult, insults are not sufficient to cause such a 
response. This is for two reasons that were given in the previous section. First, the 
insulted party might not become aware of the insult, and second, even if they do 
they might not feel offended. Therefore, the strongest claim that can be made here 
is that given the potential for insults to cause offence and other reactive emotions, 
we have a reason against performing them. For ease, I will refer to this as the 
offence norm. So, according to the offence norm, we have a pro tanto reason 
against insulting others because, if the person becomes aware of the insult, this can 
cause a particular harm against the insulted party – namely, they cause unpleasant 
                                                        
19 For further discussion see Neu, Sticks and Stones, 18-24. 
20 Joel Feinberg, Offence to Others (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 49. 
21 Feinberg, Offence to Others, 13 & 21. 
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or undesirable emotions and reactive attitudes, such as offence, fear and 
resentment.  
Even though the offence norm provides reasons against insulting others, 
these reasons can be easily outweighed. In particular, people usually deserve to be 
given the truth, even when this is insulting, and hence, they deserve to be insulted. 
Telling a political dictator who is responsible for the deaths of her own people that 
she is an evil monster might demand to be said because of, rather than despite of, 
the fact that it may cause insult. After all, helping words aren’t always kind. There 
is also the issue of liberty and freedom of speech which itself involves the freedom 
to insult.22 Hence the pro tanto reasons given by the offence norm can be, and 
often are, outweighed by other reasons. 
Can this account of general reasons against insult be applied to the specific 
case of testimonial insult? For the offence norm at least, this appears to be the case. 
Just consider how important it can be, in some situations, for one person to be 
believed over another. Various interpersonal relationships appear to manifest this 
importance, such as that between spouses. Suppose one tells the other something of 
significance, say, that she’s lost her job but was unfairly treated in this regard. To 
then have this testimony not believed by her spouse can be insulting. Moreover, it 
looks like it could cause offence leading to a negative emotional response. Her 
spouse won’t side with her on a significant issue, and if the spouse doesn’t believe 
her for the reason that she is thought to be a liar, this could easily cause a good deal 
of resentment and distrust. These, it seems, are the sorts of situations that can often 
cause interpersonal relationships to begin to degrade. Since believing the spouse in 
the first place would have prevented her from being insulted, and from feeling 
offended, it looks like the offence norm gives us a reason, in these kinds of 
situations, to believe what has been said. Indeed, not just any reason, but a moral 
reason, albeit one that is merely pro tanto. 
But are there deserved or warranted cases in which a speaker should be 
disbelieved despite of, or even because of the offence this insult will cause? It looks 
like there are. Take the story of The Boy Who Cried Wolf. Refusing the Boy’s 
testimony could be a valuable corrective to his behaviour. If nobody ever believes 
habitual liars like the Boy, then hopefully this will have a positive influence on 
their behaviour so that they will seek to become more reliable, and hence truthful 
testifiers.  
                                                        
22 See Neu, Sticks and Stones, Chapter 6. 
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We can see this issue more clearly by the way it connects with the debate 
over the norms of assertion. Given the obvious problems that arise when speakers 
mislead hearers into believing falsely, it is widely held that assertion is governed 
by a norm which instructs speakers on when one is warranted in performing an 
assertion. Leading candidates for this norm include knowledge,23 justification,24 
and truth.25 If a speaker is in clear violation of a norm such as one of these, 
insulting that person by rejecting her testimony could lead her toward sticking to 
the norm in future discourse. This may be so for the reason that if people adopt a 
policy of refusing your testimony because you are either a liar, epistemically 
incompetent, or perhaps even both, then this will cause you to feel shame and 
embarrassment. This will hopefully lead to change in the individual. The insult 
paid, in these cases, seems therefore to perform a certain rehabilitative function: if 
the speaker won’t speak the truth more often, then no one will believe her 
anymore about anything, and this can be a socially isolating punishment. This can 
also be understood in terms of blame. By disbelieving someone, we blame her for 
not acting as she should, and this blame then becomes a reason for the person to 
act otherwise in future. Bernard Williams calls this rehabilitative concept a 
‘proleptic mechanism.’26 So, it seems as though testimonial insults, when the 
testimony ought to be rejected, are not merely reasons that fail to count against 
believing the speaker, but actually look like reasons that count in favour of 
disbelieving her. In these kinds of cases, we have all-things-considered reasons to 
reject the testimony in the knowledge that it will insult. 
Let’s consider a second argument that gives us reasons against performing 
insults in general. It is sometimes argued that individual and collective flourishing 
is an ultimate, non-instrumental good.27 By insulting others, we run the risk of 
undermining this good – we can make it more difficult for ourselves and for others 
                                                        
23 Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
Chapter 11. 
24 Jennifer Lackey, “Norms of Assertion,” Nous 41 (2007): 594-626. 
25 Daniel Whiting, “Truth is (Still) the Norm for Assertion: A Reply to Littlejohn,” Erkenntnis 80 
(2015): 1245–1253. 
26 Bernard Williams, “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” in Making Sense of 
Humanity: And Other Philosophical Papers 1982-1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 42-43. 
27 Miriam McCormick, Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2015). 
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to flourish. Why might this be the case? We can derive an answer from the 
following remarks made by David Archard: 
There is something wrong with insulting another, namely the assertion or 
assumption of dominance, the aim or intention of disparaging and dishonouring 
the other. It is a failure of civility, a fall from the standards that should regulate 
the interactions of persons of equal moral worth and status.28 
There are a few distinct claims being made here. First, in insulting others, 
the insulter assumes a position of dominance over the insulted. Second, insults, 
when intended, aim to disparage others or, at least, as we saw previously, they can 
cause offence and a negative emotional response, which will still be the case with 
unintended insults. Third, insults cause us to fail to meet social standards of 
civility. These standards of civility regulate our interactions with others to ensure 
that we treat them with equal moral worth and status, and therefore, we fail to 
treat people in this way. 
Supposing that insults can lead to these outcomes, it would seem that by 
insulting others, we would not be flourishing as individuals, and we may prevent 
others from flourishing too. This is because we hardly encourage collective 
flourishing by assuming a dominant position over others, nor from disparaging 
them or treating them as having lesser moral worth and status. Rather, collective 
flourishing means trying to advance and encourage others in a positive fashion, 
instead of climbing over them with offensive remarks. Moreover, we may detract 
from ourselves as individuals. As great figures like Martin Luther King Jr. show, 
humility and respect leads to greater individual flourishing than arrogance and 
aggression. Rather than casting aspersions, one can grow in greater moral 
character, and hence individual flourishing, by resisting the urge to disparage 
others, and where necessary, to confront someone’s misgivings with good example 
and understanding.  
As with the prior issue of insults causing offence, simply resisting insult is 
not sufficient for human flourishing. Nor might it even be necessary, although it 
may well detract from it. What we see, then, is that if by performing insults we 
detract from our attainment of individual and collective flourishing, then we have 
a reason to refrain from performing them. We can refer to this as the flourishing 
norm, according to which, we have a pro tanto reason against insulting others 
because if the person becomes aware of the insult, then the insult can make it 
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harder in some way or other for ourselves and others to attain the ultimate good of 
individual and collective flourishing. 
This reason to avoid insulting others also seems to carry across into instances 
of testimony. One case in point comes when a person’s intellectual arrogance 
fosters timidity in others as testifiers.29 Suppose, for instance, that someone takes 
themselves to be intellectually superior to people compared with a certain social 
group. Furthermore, suppose this arrogant belief causes this person to disbelieve 
most of the things that are asserted from this social group. Not only do we appear 
to have an instance of epistemic injustice, but also an unwarranted insult in the 
form of a systematic rejection of testimony for the reason that the speaker(s) are 
thought to be of limited credibility as testifiers. This is damaging for the collective 
flourishing of this social group since it could foster timidity in them in the sense 
that they might become disposed to silence, rather than being disposed to share 
what they know.30 Moreover, this is damaging for the individual’s flourishing since 
a means of acquiring knowledge has been lost. As such, it seems as though 
considerations of collective and individual flourishing bear on the doxastic 
response people should give to testimony. 
Despite the fact that the flourishing norm gives reasons, these can be easily 
outweighed by some of the similar considerations we found when addressing the 
offence norm. For instance, for those people who deserve to be given the truth, 
even when this leads to an insult for that person, it doesn’t necessarily detract from 
human flourishing. If someone is abusive, informing that person in a way that can 
be insulting, whether intentionally or not, may be necessary for all the individuals 
involved to flourish. 
This sort of example also has relevant application in cases of testimony. One 
particular kind of flourishing we can achieve is intellectual.31 This might be 
compromised, though, if people are allowed to consistently violate the norms 
governing proper assertion. In that case, people would be spreading unwarranted 
assertions at best, or falsehoods at worst, and this will inhibit individual and 
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collective development. Hence, believing someone’s testimony so as to avoid 
causing insult when that person is in violation of her duties as a speaker can 
actually undermine the flourishing of oneself and others. Just as with the offence 
norm, then, the flourishing norm merely offers a pro tanto reason for belief. This 
reason may be sufficient for responding to testimony in a particular way in some 
situations, but will be outweighed in others. 
In this section we have looked at two pro tanto reasons we have to avoid 
insulting others, and applied this to instances of testimony. In these cases, it 
appeared that there are some pro tanto moral reasons that bear on the issue of what 
our doxastic response should be toward that testimony. These reasons fall out of 
general reflection on reasons against performing insults. In the next section, I will 
reintroduce epistemic reasons we have for responding to testimony. When we do 
so, we find that, perhaps surprisingly, the reasons discussed in this section do not 
need, in many cases, to be taken into practical consideration concerning whether 
one should believe a speaker to avoid insulting her. 
4. Testimonial Insult, Reasons for Belief and Reasons for Action 
4.1 Comparing Reasons for Belief 
To compare our various reasons for testimonial belief (those beliefs, including 
disbelief and suspension of judgment, that are formed on the basis of testimony), I 
want to simplify matters by introducing a taxonomy. One way to do this is in 
epistemic terms. So, we could say that for any set of testimonial beliefs a person 
has, each belief in the set is either epistemically warranted or is epistemically 
unwarranted. Working on the assumption that warrant can be defined in terms of 
one’s reasons,32 we could say that one is epistemically warranted in taking D 
toward p on the basis of testimony t provided one has responded sufficiently to the 
epistemic reasons one has for adopting D toward p. The view I am defending, then, 
claims that for any doxastic attitude D a person S holds on the basis of testimony t, 
D either responds sufficiently, in an epistemic sense, to S’s epistemic reasons, or D 
does not respond sufficiently, in an epistemic sense, to S’s epistemic reasons. One’s 
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testimonial beliefs can therefore be divided into two groups, determined by their 
responsiveness to the epistemic reasons a person has.  
I noted briefly in the introduction that I take epistemic reasons to be the 
kinds of considerations that count in favour of truth. That is, having an epistemic 
reason for believing p, such as having evidence for p, is a reason that counts in 
favour of the truth of p. Suppose you have evidence that a friend stole your pen. 
This evidence counts in favour of the truth of the proposition that your friend stole 
your pen. Given this, you have an epistemic reason to believe that your friend stole 
your pen. Now, if the evidence is indeed strong enough to mandate belief, then 
responding to it with belief would be the correct response. You would be 
responding sufficiently to the epistemic reasons you have. In that case, we can say 
that your doxastic attitude is epistemically warranted. However, you could also 
respond insufficiently by either disbelieving or suspending judgment concerning 
whether or not your friend stole your pen. In either of these cases, your doxastic 
attitude would be epistemically unwarranted. These appear to be the only two 
options for evaluating each belief in your set in epistemic terms. 
But what about other reasons that count in favour of taking D toward p? 
Shouldn’t we divide up our beliefs according to these reasons as well? For instance, 
the relationship you have with your friend might give you a moral reason to be 
partial in one’s belief towards evidence concerning her.33 Or consider that by 
believing she can overcome her illness, Jane has a greater chance of surviving it. It 
looks like, therefore, Jane has a pragmatic reason to believe that she can overcome 
her illness. Should we individuate the beliefs we have according to their 
responsiveness to pragmatic, as well as epistemic considerations? 
It seems plausible that we could divide up our beliefs this way, but we 
needn’t. This is because for each belief we hold for which pragmatic considerations 
bear on whether we should believe it, there are, in addition, always epistemic 
reasons that bear on whether we should believe it. Jane has a pragmatic reason for 
her belief. Let’s suppose she does believe that she can overcome her illness, and 
that this really will help her to overcome it. Now, she might have evidence that 
warrants believing this proposition. For instance, she could be suffering from a 
disease that when treated early has a 90% survival rate, and she is having it treated 
early. So, yes, she has pragmatic reasons for belief, but she also has epistemic 
reasons too. In that case, even if she believes for pragmatic reasons, she is still 
epistemically warranted in believing as she does. Consider the same situation, but 
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where the survival rate is 10%. Again, yes, she has pragmatic reasons for belief, but 
she also has epistemic reasons that bear on what she should believe, namely, that 
she should believe that she won’t overcome her illness. If she believes that she will, 
perhaps to be explained by pragmatic considerations, her belief is epistemically 
unwarranted. Of course, sometimes the evidence is inconclusive, as Pascal believed 
when he formulated the Wager. However, even in this case, one has epistemic 
reasons that bear on what to believe, namely, that the evidence is inconclusive, so 
the reasons warrant suspension of judgment. So, it looks as though we can 
individuate our beliefs into two categories – those that are epistemically warranted 
and those that are epistemically unwarranted – and compare from here other non-
epistemic reasons that bear on what one should believe. 
We now have a taxonomy that enables us to fully address the second broad 
aim of this paper. To state this taxonomy explicitly, begin by noting that in §2, 
every instance of testimonial insult stems from the non-belief of the hearer for a 
reason that negatively reflects on the credibility of the speaker. These doxastic 
responses can then either be epistemically warranted or epistemically 
unwarranted. They are epistemically warranted if and only if they sufficiently 
respond to the epistemic reasons that count in favour of non-belief. They are 
epistemically unwarranted when they do not sufficiently respond to such reasons. 
We have, then, instances of non-belief that lead to testimonial insult that are 
warranted, and instances that are not warranted. Our taxonomy would then be as 
follows: 
 
Non-belief of testimony 
for insulting reasons 
 
 
Epistemically warranted                                   Epistemically unwarranted 
 
Now, a reminder that my second broad aim in this paper is to explore the 
place of reasons for belief arising from testimonial insult alongside epistemic 
reasons for belief in order to identify what sort of functional role they occupy. To 
address this aim, let’s begin on the right-hand side of the taxonomy with cases of 
epistemically unwarranted testimonial insult. 
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4.2 Unwarranted Insult 
A quintessential example of unwarranted insult is Miranda Fricker’s notion of 
testimonial injustice. In these cases, negative stereotypes can embody prejudices 
that work against the speaker in a way that leads the hearer to make “an unduly 
deflated judgement of the speaker’s credibility, perhaps missing out on knowledge 
as a result.”34 As an actual case in point, take those societies in which the testimony 
of women is disregarded out of hand by men because of a prejudice that deflates 
their credibility as testifiers. These cases meet Fricker’s description and, as Fricker 
notes, also constitute a testimonial insult.35 As we saw in §3, there are norms that 
appear to give moral reasons against insulting people through our non-belief. In 
this particular case, other norms will be in play too, such as those relating to justice 
and fairness. Does it follow, then, that testimonial insult gives us a reason to 
believe speakers in instances of testimonial injustice? I believe that the answer to 
this is ‘yes,’ but with the important qualification that there are always other 
sufficient reasons to believe speakers in these instances, which arise from 
epistemic, rather than moral considerations.36 Let me explain why. 
Consider the kinds of cases we’re looking at as they map onto the taxonomy: 
they are epistemically unwarranted. This is what makes epistemic injustice a case 
in point. As Fricker describes it, the hearer’s judgement ‘unduly’ deflates the 
speaker’s credibility. This undue judgment is undue in an epistemic sense. We are 
saying that there are sufficient epistemic reasons for the hearer to believe the 
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Finlay Malcolm 
44 
speaker. However, the hearer does not believe the speaker, and so fails to respond 
sufficiently to the testimony given. This is because there is something defective in 
the hearer. The hearer has no epistemic reasons that warrant her deflating the 
credibility of the speaker, and yet she does, and in virtue of this, her doxastic 
outcome – disbelief, or at best, suspension of judgement – is unwarranted. What 
this means is that in these cases, the hearer in the exchange has sufficient epistemic 
reasons to believe the speaker, and without other pro-tanto reasons outweighing 
these epistemic reasons, then we might argue that, epistemically speaking, she 
ought to be believe the speaker. To fail to do so would be a failure of epistemic 
competence by failing to respond sufficiently to the epistemic reasons one has for 
belief. So, when we ask whether there are moral reasons that bear on the hearer’s 
doxastic response, the answer may be yes, but if we then ask whether she should 
base her decision over whether or not to believe the speaker on these reasons, then 
the answer is that she does not need to because she has sufficient epistemic reasons 
to do so. Basing one’s action on an aggregation of both moral and epistemic reasons 
is not necessary when both kinds of reasons are sufficient. What we would have in 
that case would be an overdetermination of reasons. 
My argument here might be more clearly seen in a more general context. 
Suppose someone has sufficient moral reason to volunteer at the soup kitchen this 
weekend, but that also, she will enjoy doing so because her friend is also planning 
to volunteer. So, she has two sufficient reasons to volunteer at the soup kitchen. 
She could base her decision to volunteer on both reasons, but she needn’t: each 
reason is a sufficient basis for action, and so she has an overdetermination of 
reasons.37  
Someone might wish to argue, however, that some reasons are a better basis 
for action than others, and that I should pursue this route to prop up my argument. 
For instance, it might be morally better for me to volunteer for moral reasons, 
rather than the reason that I want to spend time with a friend, and so it might be 
argued that the former, rather than the latter, is a better reason for action and 
should be the basis of my decision to volunteer. Comparably, in an epistemic sense, 
it might be thought impossible, or at best extremely difficult to base a belief on 
non-epistemic reasons.38 Surely, then, this fact modifies the moral reasons arising 
from testimonial insult by either disabling them, or making them much less 
appealing as a reason for belief compared with epistemic reasons. The epistemic 
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reasons are better because they are more possible or likely reasons for belief. In 
that case, when I have both sufficient moral and epistemic reasons for belief, I 
should base my belief on the better, epistemic reason. This may be correct, and 
Shah and others who reject the possibility of non-epistemic reasons for belief may 
be right in what they say. However, undermining moral reasons for belief in this 
way is both a separate issue, and distinct from the conclusion I am looking to 
defend. What I am defending is the following conditional: even if it is possible to 
base a belief on non-epistemic reasons, in the case of unwarranted testimonial 
insult the arising moral reasons for belief do not need to be the basis of our doxastic 
response to testimony; there are always alternatives in the form of epistemic 
reasons for belief. So, the position I defend for unwarranted insult is consistent 
with the theoretical existence of moral reasons for belief, but one that is practically 
consistent with rationally ignoring such reasons. This middle route has not to my 
knowledge been previously defended, and does not rely on the deflation of non-
epistemic reasons. 
The conditional conclusion I am defending follows from any case on the 
right-hand side of the taxonomy of testimonial insult. The reason for this is, 
simply, that all cases on that side are epistemically unwarranted, and hence, there 
will always be sufficient epistemic reason to change one’s doxastic attitudes from 
unwarranted non-belief, to warranted belief. The moral reasons I have considered 
thus far simply don’t need to feature in our reasons for belief. Moral considerations 
in cases of epistemically unwarranted testimonial insult are non-required optional 
extras. 
4.3 Warranted Insult 
Let’s now move to the other side of the taxonomy to consider cases of epistemically 
warranted non-belief. These are cases in which one’s doxastic response to 
testimony is either disbelief or suspension of judgment. The reasons one has for not 
believing the testimony will be epistemic, but in addition, I will only consider 
those cases in which the non-belief embodies an insult, i.e. when the testimony is 
not believed for reasons that negatively reflect on the speaker’s credibility. One 
kind of example that meets this definition is the Boy Who Cried Wolf. What we 
saw earlier, though, was that rather than insults being a reason to believe the Boy, 
insults actually gave further reasons to retain one’s non-belief. This was because 
such insults function as a valuable corrective to the liar’s behaviour, which has a 
greater outcome all things considered.  
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In §2 I maintained that, contrary to Anscombe,39 warranted non-belief can 
manifest an insult. If I am wrong then the ensuing discussion is unnecessary. 
Perhaps all cases are like the aforementioned Boy Who Cried Wolf and there really 
are no reasons for belief coming from insult along this side of the taxonomy. Since 
I suspect that view is mistaken, I will offer one line of example that I feel fits the 
picture of warranted non-belief that constitutes a testimonial insult. 
What cases, then, from the left-hand side of the taxonomy do appear 
affected by moral considerations stemming from testimonial insult? One obvious 
candidate are cases of interpersonal relationship. The spouse example from §3 looks 
like a case in point. Suppose the spouse, who is acting as the hearer, has sufficient 
epistemic reasons to believe that his spouse was fairly treated in being fired from 
the job. When his spouse reports that she was treated unfairly, we could imagine, 
for the sake of the example, that even this testimony, which is itself an epistemic 
reason to believe, is not weighty enough to warrant the hearer in changing his 
attitudes from non-belief to belief. Perhaps this is because he thinks that his spouse 
is being untruthful. In that case, he testimonially insults his spouse by negatively 
judging her credibility as a speaker. The implications of this could be profoundly 
negative. The offence it can cause may drive a wedge between the two spouses, 
leading to the breakdown of trust. If the first spouse had simply believed 
differently, he could have avoided such negative consequences. And a similar story 
could be told of other kinds of interpersonal relationship too. 
Might it be possible, though, to avoid this consequence through other means 
than simply believing the spouse? On further reflection on this sort of case, it looks 
like what the speaker is asking of the hearer is for support in the sense that the 
hearer agrees with her on a matter of importance. Certainly, by believing her we 
can agree with her in this matter. But, it could be argued, we can also agree with 
her by accepting what she says, even when we don’t believe her. Accepting 
testimony involves taking the proposition you have been told as a premise in your 
practical reasoning. As such, even when you don’t believe p, you act as if p by 
adopting a policy of going along with p in some or all of your deliberations.40 The 
one spouse can then agree with the other by acting as though she has been served 
an injustice through his actions, even if he doesn’t believe this. Therefore, although 
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the lack of belief may embody an insult, one can make up for this with one’s 
actions.  
Is there any reason for thinking that this isn’t sufficient for agreeing with 
another person? The problem is that the one spouse, when accepting-but-not-
believing the testimony of the other, is involved in a clear case of insincerity. Of 
course, he is doing so in order to cloak his disbelief so as not to insult his spouse, 
but suppose she found out that he actually disbelieves her testimony. It seems 
highly implausible that his spouse would take his acceptance as a form of 
agreement. What she wants from him is for him to believe her, not to pretend to 
believe her. The latter involves a sort of well-meaning deception where the 
testifier does not get agreement, whereas the former is a genuine form of 
agreement, and one that would prevent a testimonial insult. 
There may, of course, be forms of support that do not require agreement, 
and which I can be involved in through non-doxastic acceptance, or non-doxastic 
trust, that will suffice to offset any insult that arises from my non-belief. For one 
example, I can support someone in her attempts to become a better person without 
trusting that person, as when I mentor someone with a criminal background to 
help her settle into society. I may not believe her when she says she is committed 
to reform, but the insult this may cause can be offset by my acting contrary to 
what I believe. This show of faith on my part could go some way to compensate for 
any offence that my non-belief can cause. Moreover, there are kinds of trust that 
do not appear to require belief. For example, with ‘therapeutic trust’ one trusts 
someone ‘with the aim of bringing about trustworthiness,’41 as when a mother 
trusts her daughter to look after the house for the weekend.42 The mother needn’t 
actually believe the daughter when she tells her that the house will be well looked 
after in order to exhibit this trust. She might simply accept what the daughter says 
by acting as though what she says is true. 
In these instances of support, my actions can offset any testimonial insult. 
However, in other cases, such as those requiring agreement, non-doxastic 
acceptance or trust will not be sufficient. What is required of me is belief. Here, 
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the moral reasons for belief arising from testimonial insult make for important 
considerations, and do genuinely count in favour of belief. 
Where does this leave the moral reasons we have for belief that appear to 
come from testimonial insult that we saw in §3? On the unwarranted side of the 
taxonomy, epistemic reasons are sufficient to warrant belief, and so moral reasons 
are not required. On the warranted side, first, epistemic reasons are sufficient to 
retain non-belief in cases where the speaker deserves to be not believed, so again, 
moral reasons are not required. Second, in some cases, moral reasons for belief do 
not need to be the basis of our believing a piece of testimony since some actions are 
sufficient to offset the insult. In other cases, though, particularly those concerning 
our most important interpersonal relationships, moral reasons for belief play an 
important, albeit pro-tanto role in guiding what to believe. We can conclude, then, 
that even though testimonial insult gives us reasons that count in favour of belief, 
in many or most cases, one does not need to base one’s belief on these reasons. 
Instead, in many cases, one will always have either sufficient epistemic reasons, or 
sufficient reasons that count in favour of action, and believing or acting on these 
can be the means by which we avoid or supress the insult, and hence can be a 
sufficient response to the moral reasons given by testimonial insult. There are, 
though, some important exceptions to this claim, particularly those in which we 
are required to agree with someone in whom we have a close relationship. 
5. Conclusion 
In the current debate over reasons for belief, the claim that there can be pragmatic 
reasons that count in favour of belief remains controversial, despite there being 
some hope for the position.43 In this paper I have supported the existence of 
pragmatic reasons for belief. However, I have also side-stepped their practical 
influence by claiming that in many cases such reasons need not bear consequence 
when it comes to determining what our doxastic response should be towards 
testimony. There are several ways to object to moral reasons for belief, and this 
looks to me to be an unexplored strategy for deprioritising pragmatic reasons for 
belief, and in effect, centring discussion on epistemic reasons. It would be 
interesting to see where this strategy could be employed further in the current 
lively debate over reasons for belief. 
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